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“Documentarism and Theory of Literature” suggests an interweaving of 
two comprehensive topics, the one presumably dealing with ways of 
inventing and writing texts and the other with ways of imagining and 
analyzing them. This distinction is sound, since it delimits the field of 
literary criticism from the field of literary practice; but however good 
for a start, the approach runs into problems as far as literary documenta-
rism is concerned. This is because of the double gesture of this practice: 
in “documenting” records of authentic fact and “autheticating” the pro-
cedure by way of rhetorical devices, and in simultaneously questioning 
these doings, documentarism also tends to metafiction—thus invading 
the field of criticism. In other words, the breakdown of the distinction 
between theory and literature reoresents a kind of interweaving, an it is 
that particular interweaving which I plan to discuss. 
My inquiry is grounded in my previous studies in Swedish prose of the 
1960’s.1 My focus will lie on poetics, interweaving theory and literature 
from the point of view of the text (or type of text) under scrutiny. Poe-
tics, I take it, is literary theory assimilated in the text, and thus subjected 
to literary practice. Accordingly, a poetics manifests itself as a literary 
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method in the sense of unveiling precisely what makes the text become 
this particular text displaying this particular strategy. Thus, for the critic 
to analyze the text is to discover its poetics by investigating its strategies 
and the corresponding modes of thought producing them. This critical 
approach is phenomenological and rhetorical in that it constructs the 
processes of the text by focusing on its verbal imagination. But it is also 
theoretical and literary in that it investigates the theoretical outlook of 
the text by focusing on its literary methodology as displayed in its hand-
ling of the chosen material. And since in documentarism the question of 
method is of the utmost importance, not only as literary practice but 
also as didactic theme, I consider this approach useful for understanding 
documentarism. 
In order to pursue this particular approach, I shall restrict myself to an 
investigation of the “emblematic” stance as it were, seemingly in the 
margins of what might be considered modern documentarism.2 Ne-
vertheless, the stance is relevant, as it corresponds to a theoretical out-
look which emphasizes factual observation and various “documentary” 
strategies in its way of grasping unnoticed significances of mundane life 
and the visible world. Moreover, it offers a historical perspective, associ-
ated with the rise of the novel and literary realism, as well as with mo-
dernist experimentalism, and postmodernist didacticism. 
I shall return to these “emblematic” aspects of documentarism shortly. 
What I wish to address right now, however, is a theoretical notion of 
literary documentarism as a thought mode as well as an art form. Both 
of these aspects are related to presentational modes where individual 
phenomena signify a context; where “fragments” operate as thought 
provoking metonyms; and where “documents” display puzzle pictures, 
finally turning into virtual thought figures. 
                                                 
2
  As  for  the  theory  on  modern  documentarism,  most  important  in  this  essay  is  Linda 
Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism (1988). Others backgrounding this paper are studi‐
es by Glowinsky,  Hallberg, Hertel, McCaffery, McCord, and Sauerberg (see Bibliography). 
     2 
There is no mystification in this: on the contrary, this presentational 
mode, with its corresponding thought mode, disautomatizes habitual 
modes of not-seeing what is actually visible, and even perceived. The 
strategy involved is in the presentational mode: it complicates simplifi-
cations and it simplifies complications, so that the phenomenon in fo-
cus—in this case the “document”—becomes re-contextualized. Yet the 
strategy is not difficult to access. In fact, its double reversal, in fact, is 
part and parcel of a maieutic (“midwife”) didactics. In the Swedish 
1960s it was seen in the light of the new reader-oriented aesthetics of 
which documentarism is but one example. 
Thus, what I’ll do in this essay is introduce this emblematic thought 
mode as a theoretical perspective as well as a poetics and suggest its bea-
ring on a cluster of phenomena which I’ll designate as documentary, in 
some cases as historiographic metafiction. In doing this, I shall address a 
few theoretical issues bearing on documentarism as a literary strategy 
and also discuss methods of discovering and analyzing such strategies 
from the standpoint of rhetorical construction. 
Theory of Literature and Poetics: a Pragmatic Perspective 
 
The Pre-Modern View 
Documentarism and theory of literature also happen to be among the 
most fashionable issues in current literary debate and praxis, as well, at 
least since the 1960s.3 And before that—indeed, since ancient times—
these topics have posed similiar problems and questions, albeit under 
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different names. To approach the emblematic thought mode I’ll have to 
elaborate a little on this general background. 
Theory of Literature was once an aspect of poetics, that is, of modes of 
thinking and methods of writing directly related to a literary praxis. 
Theory, in this pre-modern poetics, was a pragmatics—although a re-
flective pragmatics. This pragmatics was a rhetoric, and in that capacity 
it was oriented in two directions: on the one hand it was oriented out-
wards, towards an end or effective function (pertaining to rea-
der/audience/society; and, of course, to political power/ autho-
rithy/establishment). On the other hand it was oriented inwards, to-
wards the artefact, which was understood as a means to this end. In this 
capacity it was seen mainly as an artistic craft. 
M. H. Abrams formulationss on this topic in The Mirror and the Lamp 
(1953; 1971) are useful. A pragmatic theory, he says, is “ordered toward 
the audience,” since “it looks at the work of art chiefly as a means to an 
end, an instrument for getting something done, and tends to judge its 
value according to its success in acheieving that aim”.4 Thus, the inward 
focus is on craft, rules, method, and repertory, rather than expression, 
inspiration, and originality; and thus the inward focus on the artefact 
interacts with the outward focus on the audience and the socio-cultural 
frame of reference.5 This pragmatic-rhetorical perspective is relevant for 
my approach to documentarism, the theory of literature, and the inter-
weaving I am suggesting. 
Seen in this perspective, literary documentarism has a long history, rela-
ted not only to modern realism, naturalism, imagism, journalism, and 
mass-medialism, as is well known, but also to ancient problematics of 
mimesis and realism versus fantasy and romance. In this way documen-
tarism, as a mixed literary mode, also pertains to rhetorical issues of cre-
dibility and trustworthiness and to demands for separation of high and 
low styles and generic purity, that is, to the Classical doctrine of Deco-
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rum, and its idealist-aestheticist offspring in the late nineteenth century 
and in the formalism of the twentieth century.6 As regards theory, do-
cumentarism also refers to fundamental philosophic issues concerning 
the nature of knowledge, reality, truth, reference, and meaning. At the 
other “empirical” end of this axis, documentarism is, of course, related 
to historiography (and the historical novel), that is, to the rhetorics of 
preserving fact. 
On the other hand, documentarism in the sense of a special strategy of 
recycling already written texts in the making of new ones, or of inserting 
non-literary ready-mades in a literary discourse, or even of fictionalizing 
facts, is a modern occurrence. This kind of practice could not arise in 
the pre-modern rhetorical system of literature since these devices already 
belonged to the standard repertory of this system.7 
In the first place, the very distinction between literature and non-
literature upon which the modern concept of documentarism rests was 
neither made nor required in the pre-modern system, since all signifi-
cant discourse was produced and received in terms of rhetorical strategi-
es. Thus, all discourse was ‘literary’ in the sense that it was skilful artifi-
ce, submitted to rules, norms, and conventions pertaining to ingenious 
processing of the verbal medium.8 
Secondly, the distinction between fact and fiction was not made either, 
not in our modern sense. “Fact” and “truth” were not conceived in 
terms of formal logic or empirical correspondence, but in terms of cohe-
rence, consensus, and accepted procedures. That is, they pertained to 
the current cultural system of acknowledged authority and the common 
frame of reference transmitted by oral and written tradition. This was 
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preserved in the literary canon and available as a repertory of rhetorical 
strategies and verbal commonplaces. Thus, all phenomena available 
within this system were counted as “Fact.” “Fiction” was what did not 
belong to this system, that is the alien, the unconventional, the inde-
cent—and the new (that’s how the novella got its name and why it was 
excluded from, or given a low place in, the hierarchy of genres).9  
Thus, the concept of “fact” referred to any conception, idea, cliché, or 
hypogram acknowledged as belonging to this traditional system—
however ”false” or ”fictional” in our sense; while inversely the “truth” in 
our sense might be considered false or fictional simply because uncon-
ventional, and therefore rhetorically useless. “Fact” was all that could be 
used as an “argument” in the enthymeme (that is, the counterpart in rhe-
toric of the syllogism in logic) and all acknowledged commonplaces 
served, however faulty, as argument.10 In this way even mythic and fan-
tastic phenomena not actually believed were included in the factual re-
pertory. As long as these phenomena were “documented” in authorized 
discourse, like bestiaries (the second-century Physiologus, for example), 
they were also significant, and thus recyclable in a new discourse. This 
standard repertory was comparable to a dictionary, supplying rhetorical 
categories and words. In fact, dictionaries of this sort were edited (Cesa-
re Ripa, Alstedius); and so were collections of authorized sayings and 
formulas in florilegies—all allowing this kind of verbal inventory to be 
re-used, elaborated, and even displaced as new rhetorical discourse. 
The practice of recycling had three specifically rhetorical purposes. The 
first, pertaining to the process of inventio, or conceptual composing, was 
to find apt thought figures, that could effectively display the subject 
matter within a well-known frame of reference. Another purpose was to 
authorize the new discourse, in accordance with the rhetorical demand 
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for Ethos, or trustworthiness of the speaker. The third purpose was to 
establish a consensus from which to develop the deviations and displa-
cements. All three purposes served the overarching pragmatic function 
of rhetorical discourse; that is, its orientation towards utility, occasion 
and the public.11 
This practice of recycling by documenting and quoting while elabora-
ting and displacing is also the very essence of the Classicist poetics of 
imitatio. This “imitation” was not restricted to copying—although co-
pying certainly was part of it (and even constituted a special genre, that 
of the cento, which was made entirely with cut-outs from other texts). 
But as a rule, the purpose of imitation was not to copy but to recycle 
new aims and finctions. And further, the repeated formula was no mere 
sign, but factual reality—that is, the culturally- given reality of historical 
narrative, religious dogma, social attitudes, common ideas of belief, and 
mental conceptions. This conceptual framework was considered part of 
reality, since it was the frame of reference within which experiental life 
actually came into conceivable being. 
Also, the matter of these conceptions (the res) did not belong to the 
past; “history‚” and “tradition” in our temporal sense are modern con-
structions. In pre-modern rhetorical culture, what is collectively “re-
membered” and stored in ”memory” is also encoded in the cultural re-
pertory—and all this is seen as contemporary.12 Quoting was speaking on 
behalf on the auctor, empowered by the auctoritas of an ever ongoing 
discourse; and narrating meant making making an ever ongoing story 
unfold anew under new circumstances. This quoting and narrating was 
not reviving anything dead, lost or gone. Neither did this repetition 
reproduce the same wording or composition; rather it processed the 
same verbal imagination by adapting the same cultural repertory to the 
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pragmatic needs of new specific occasions.13 Thus, imitation was a mat-
ter of “presenting” the present—or of “re-presenting” the already pre-
sent. In this sense, it documents the facticity of the present, and as such 
it also processes and slightly diplaces the present, serving to make this 
facticity “presentable” in speech and to preserve its capacity for future 
presences.14 
This rhetorical view, where acknowledged fictions are considered factu-
al, where documents are seen as contemporary, and where imitation is a 
processing and a presentation of ever-present significances—this view is 
part of the emblematic thought mode of the late Renaissance. But it is 
also one of the important trends in modern literary documentarism, I 
believe, especially in historiographic metafiction as it corresponds to 
“new” novelistic forms of the Swedish 1960s. 
Documentarism and Theory of Literature 
In this context, theory of literature may refer to a reflective practice con-
cering the interaction of writing and reading literary texts. This practice 
elaborates literary strategies anticipating certain modes of reading, each 
capable of generating in receptionist terms different individual rea-
dings—or “concretizations.”.15 Likewise, documentarism, in this context, 
may refer to a special way of transforming reality into signs, which we 
call remnants, testimonies, or traces, and of transforming these signs 
back to reality—this time reality of a second order: a discursive world, 
as it were, where signs are things, which we may call documents. A do-
cument is thus a signifying thing or, if you prefer, a thinglike sign poin-
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ting towards an absent reality or past event, while at the same time 
being present reality here and now. This discursive reality, where signs 
are things we call the world of facts. And since documents are made by 
signs, they are also texts, in this case documenting or documentary 
texts; the two categories sometimes are inserted in one another. 
Furthermore, the discursive world of documented facts is also the di-
scursive world of history: not in a brutal sense of past events (that are 
gone and lost and never really seen by anybody), but in the structured 
sense of historiography, which  is also the mode of historical realism—
that is, the grafting of narrative fiction on the world.16 Inversely, as argu-
ed by Hayden White, this world of realistic fiction is also the world on 
which narrative historiography is grafted; thus, in both these “realist” 
modes the same kind of narrative logic is operative and generating the 
same kind of plot structures, rhetorical strategies and literary devices.17 
On a more fundamental phenomenological level, the narrative interac-
tion between historiography and literature is seen as an instance of ima-
ginative logic structuring all experience and its corresponding experien-
tal modes. On this level, all knowledge and understanding is narrative, 
or in Kantian terms, presupposes narrative as the “cognitive category.” 
So, in these terms, narrative is not a result, but the very process of un-
derstanding. Narrative somehow begets understanding, and not the 
other way around, and yet understanding seems to beget more narrati-
ves: some are presented or accepted as history and science; others as 
fiction and literature. 
Adequate texts of the “historical” kind are considered true, by virtue of 
correspondence to empirical facts, that is, to the testimony of those tex-
tual things we call “documents.” Lacking this sort of correspondence, 
texts of the “fictional” kind are considered false, although they may be 
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cnsidered significant in their distinctive internal coherence. In fact, their 
internal coherence is a matter of correspondence as well:  not to external 
facts but to an accepted experiental logic and grammar. As a narrative 
mode, it is describable in terms of phenomenology and structural lingu-
istics. 
Leaving all this aside, these narratives are texts, and in that capacity his-
torical as well as “documentary”. They are the factual traces of the (per-
haps still ongoing) cultural event in which they took place and came 
into being. Commenting on historical documents, these texts themsel-
ves come into being as historical documents, and in that capacity as 
potential objects of future historical research, of literary study—and of 
narrative invention. 
Poetics of Documentarism: Some Strategies 
Let us now consider documentarism as a general term that signifies a 
cluster of textual strategies: gathering and rearranging verbal remnants 
and traces of a past state or event and exploring, interpreting, and recon-
structing the past through its present imprints in a process of narrativi-
zation. The constructive and inventive aspects of this narrativization is 
the issue of Hayden White, who, in his Metahistory, examines its rheto-
rical devices in terms of conventional plot structures. Documentarism in 
this sense, of course, is intertwined with conventions of historiograpy 
and related issues, although it is not identical to them: historiography is 
seen as a discipline, while documentarism is seen as a methodology. As 
methodology it has been scrutinized by, among others, Michel Fouca-
ult, who in his L’Archéologie du savoir questions not only the constructi-
ve paradigm of narrative historiography but also the very evidence of the 
document.18 On a more fundamental phenomenological level, narrativi-
zation has been seen as a mental habit, associated with an alleged con-
ceptual necessity. It either has the purpose of shaping and ordering the 
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“futile chaos” of experiental world, by means of myth (as T. S. Eliot, the 
modernist, would have it)19 or of “mastering” the “agonistic aspect” of 
the social world by means of discursive strategies (as the post-modernist 
J. F. Lyotard would have it).20 Both the ordering and the mastering in-
volve a “cognitive mapping” of the world,” by means of a meta-narrative 
“plotting” (as, finally, suggested by the post-postmodernist Frederick 
Jameson).21 
In this perspective, literary documentarism might signify a cluster of 
poetics or aesthetic-didactic strategies, that adopt and recycle documen-
tary material as verbal ready-mades in order to question fundamental 
political, philosophical, or literary issues—including not only the ongo-
ing narrativization process itself, but also the very nature of the docu-
ment. Literary Documentarism thus tends to metafiction: either thro-
ugh strategies of “over-narrativization,” and even overt fabulation, or 
through strategies of “over-documentation”, narrative reduction, and 
fragmentation. 
The over-narrative strategy may tend to melodrama as in John Fowles, 
or absurdist grotesque as in Günter Grass and John Barth; or “magical” 
realism,” as in Garçia Márquez. As for Sweden, we may recall historio-
graphic picaresques like Sven Delblanc’s Prästkappan (1963; The Priest’s 
Gown) and P. C. Jersild’s Calvinols resa genom världen (1965; Calvinol’s 
Journey through the World) as well as hyper-realist mystery fictions like 
P. G. Evander’s contemporary ‘“case-study” Uppkomlingarna (1969; 
The Upstarts). 
The oover-documenting strategy, by contrast, may tend toward collage, 
montage, mobile, or even cataloque and list—as in Alexander Kluge’s 
Schlachtbeschreibung (1964; trans. Slaget, 1965) modelled on the battle of 
Stalingrad, or as in P. O. Enquist’s fictional “dissertation” manuscript 
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Hess (1966). Here the documents and data are handled neither as sources 
nor as traces, symptoms, or even narrative matter, but as linguistic 
fragments or segments where factual names and commonplace data ope-
rate as signs and concepts loaded with implicit narrative meanings and 
contextual significances. Thus charged, these segments may be recycled 
and recombined, not only to serve as “alternative” narratives, but to 
question those narratives already in existence (including the ideologic-
conceptual networks associated with their construction). As a matter of 
fact, the strategy may not be narrative at all, but either non-narrative or 
anti-narrative—as typically demonstrated by the cut-out-devices in Klu-
ge’s “slaughter description.”22 
 However, the overdocumenting metafictional strategy may also be disp-
layed by less reductive means, and even by seemingly conventional nar-
rative realisms. Here P. O. Sundman’s Andrée-project might serve as an 
example with the historical novel Ingenjör Andrées luftfärd (1967; Eng. 
tr. The Flight of the Eagle, 1970,), the writer’s work journal, Ett år (1967; 
One Year), and, finally, the author’s annotated documentation of the 
source materials, Ingen fruktan, intet hopp (1968; No Fear, No Hope). 
Focusing on the Andrée-figure as a textual ready-made and displaying it 
in different contextual perspectives, the three documentary variants pro-
ject not only a picture of puzzle imbued with historiographic problems, 
but a textual mobile changing its thought-provoking import with each 
position of reading—from the narrative mode of the fictional novel 
through the commentary mode of the confessional journal to the pre-
sentational mode of the documentary collage where even the poor con-
dition and unreadable pages are demonstrated. 
Paradigmatically, however, the metafictional documentary strategy is 
displayed as an ongoing research process, “overdocumenting,” as it were, 
but within the “overnarrative” discourse of a fictionalized factual inves-
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tigation. Commenting on the means and methods being used in gathe-
ring the “documents” and to construct their “history,” this kind of di-
scourse hinges on the limit of both fiction and non-fiction, resulting in 
“non-fiction fiction,” or perhaps “faction.” This form of novelistic beha-
viour is clearly in evidence in P. O. Enquists Legionärerna (1968; Eng. 
tr. The Legionnaires, 1973) of the Swedish 60s. It focuses on classified  
records on the extradition of Baltic refugees in 1945. A similar approach 
can be seen in Sven Delblanc’s Samuels bok of the 80’s (1981; Samuel’s 
book), which draws on the author’s grandfather’s private diary in order 
to narrativize its laconic fragments and bring its sad story to light. Ho-
wever divergent in other respects these two texts are both processing 
documents, searching for the truth and finding an endless readability. 
This readability opens up an overwhelming narrative potential which 
questions the nature of the document; at the same time it also prompts 
a personal stance which questions the nature of the writer’s involvement 
in his matter. The documentary and historiographic project is thus in-
tersected by fictionalizing as well as autobiographical-confessional ten-
dencies toward displacement of the scribal task; and these displacing 
tendencies, in turn, constitute the forming narrative means by which the 
self-exploring confessional texts figure as the subjective pole of the do-
cumentary genre axis, as its other side, so to speak. 
In, for instance, Jan Myrdals Samtida bekännelser av en europeisk intel-
lektuell (1964; Eng. tr. Confessions of a Disloyal European; 1968, 1990), 
Sven Lindqvists Myten om Wu Tao zu (1967; The Myth of Wu Tao-
tzu), Folke Isaksson’s Dubbelliv (1968; Double Life), and Delblanc’s 
Åsnebrygga (1969; Donkey’s Bridge [A Remedial Reader]), this subjecti-
ve stance is explicitly acknowledged, while contemporary reality is do-
cumented, explored and questioned. In writing, the subjective stance is 
submitted to the same exploratory process as the objective material, and 
the same overdocumenting and overnarrative devices are being used. 
Here the problem of truth is transposed to the problem of honesty and 
sincerity; but even these virtues are questioned as either faulty or banal. 
Myrdal and Delblanc, for instance, explicitly fictionalize their speaking 
subjects, displaying their alter egos as figures of the text, but also as 
points of view subjected to commentary by a distant narrative instance, 
saying not “I,” but “He,” “JM,” or “Deblanc”. Delblanc even subtitled 
his book “Dagboks-roman” (Diary-novel). 
Truth and honesty turn out to be not factual qualities or states of mind, 
but relational processes discoursing complex issues that cannot be stated, 
described, or even told straightforwardly. These non-propositional issues 
pertain to philosophy and phenomenology just as well as politics and 
history; likewise, the documentary archives in these cases are personal 
memories and private experiences just as well as newspapers and public 
libraries. 
At the other, “objective,“ end of this axis we find the paradigmatic non-
fiction “fiction” of Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1969), and the like; 
as for Sweden, similar, but perhaps more complex variants are found in, 
for instance, Kerstin Ekman’s Menedarna (1970; The Perjurers), dealing 
with the case of Joe Hill, and Birger Norman’s Ådalen 31 (1968), con-
cerning the miltary shooting deaths of striking workers on a protest 
march. The paradigm of non-fiction “fiction” refers to narrative ac-
counts of factual “cases” or events where documents are processed by 
fictionalizing means into conceivable, lifelike, and allegedly reliable sto-
ries. This strategy, of course, pertains to the traditional realistic devices 
of “les petits faits vrais” and “l’effet du réel,” including bias and authori-
al dominance. It may even, as in Norman, comprise an overdocumenta-
tion, recording contrasting accounts of the same event and supporting 
historical documents with fresh reports, interviews, and authorial com-
ment. But the strategy may also, as in Ekman, comprise an overnarrati-
vization, developing standard conventions of the detective story so as to 
critically offset romance aspects of the already legendary “case” in ques-
tion. The fictive I-narrator, playing the double part of clue-searching 
detective and the puzzled investigator of an authentic “case,” also assu-
mes the role of a marginalized outsider who offers an alternative per-
spective on supposedly well-known matters. 
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This interactionist tension between overdocumentation and 
overnarrativization is seen even in New Journalism, report-literature, 
and other hybrid modes where dramatized presentation of authentic 
discourse is the overriding strategy.23 This is a matter of scenic re-
presentation, where an authentic telling is being shown—a ‘showing of a 
telling’—as it were, presented as a cut-out picture, and framed by 
editorial or “journalistic” commentary. And since it is authentic, the 
presented narrative is also overnarrative. It is either represented in its 
authentic state with its spontaneous, original wording preserved—for 
the purpose of seeming authentic—or its original wording is been edited 
to bring about the authentic effect. While an overnarrative tendency to 
fictionalize is somehow penetrating the documenting strategy from 
underneath, the overnarration is itself an overdocumentation of those 
“petits faits vrais” that authenticate the story. 
As for report-books, the device of “showing-a-telling” is extended into a 
juxtaposing of different authentic narrative accounts or testimonies of a 
common matter. cases in point are Jan Myrdal’s Rapport från kinesisk by 
(1963; Report from a Chinese Village), Carin Mannheimer in Rapport 
om kvinnor (1969; Report about Women), and Sture Källberg in Rap-
port från medelsvensk stad. Västerås (1969; Eng. tr. Off the Middle Way: 
report from a Swedish Village). A series of documents may be accompani-
ed by an editorial preface or postscript and sometimes also interspersed 
with editorial commentary and supplementary information, as in Myr-
dal’s work; and sometimes quotations may be suggestively counterposed 
, as in Sara Lidman’s Gruva (1968; Mine).24 But the point of the techni-
que is always the overdocumentation of overnarrative accounts of the 
topic or theme at issue, calling for the reader’s commitment and emo-
                                                 
23
  As for emphasis on the authenticity‐criterion, see, for instance Elveson (1979), p. 19f ;  
and Thygesen (1971), pp. 12f, 14, 75‐78. Cf. the critical discussion, emphasizing “performa‐
tory” aspects, in Zilliacus (1977), pp 355‐368, and in Printz‐Påhlson (1971), p. 243. 
24
  See Thygesen, pp. 16‐23, 35‐40. 
tional response.25 “Medvetandegöra” was the (slightly ungrammatical) 
slogan of the 1960s, brought into fashion by Jan Myrdal, meaning “ma-
king aware” in both the informative and emotive sense. The same rheto-
rical strategy applies, for instance, in Göran Palm’s “auto-biographical” 
LM-reportage (Ett år på LM, 1972, and Bokslut från LM, 1974; Eng. tr. 
[an abridged edition of both texts] The Flight from Work, 1977) where 
the industrial worker’s accounts are inscribed in the authir’s openly per-
sonal (and thus fictionalized) narration of his own experiences on the 
shop floor.26 Using personal experiences to authenticate the author’s 
testimony, this kind of autobiographical strategy is typical of the repor-
tage genre. 
While the different strategies have all been shown to process facts in one 
way or another, the question remains which emblematic thought mode 
they each bring to bear on this process. 
An Example of the Thought Mode: Göran Palm’s “Unfair Meditation” 
In his much-read essay En orättvis betraktelse (1966; An Unfair Medita-
tion), Göran Palm clearly adopts a didactic strategy, which, regardless of 
its polemic effect, finally discloses an emblematic thought mode. In this 
“unfair meditation” documents of dominating and dominated cultures, 
races and classes are seen as opposites so as to mirror each other’s way of 
looking at one another. It is a reversal of perspectives in the form of a 
                                                 
25
  This implicit committing‐emotional aspect is emphasized in Thygesen, who also stresses 
the  implicit  narrative  strategies  in Myrdal’s modes of  presentation—“sluttet  episk  form,” 
(forms of epic closure) and “episke grundtyper” (basic types of epics) (pp. 20, 22, 33f, 35‐
44).  Thygesen also emphasizes  Lidman’s  fabulative  and  lyrical  strategies  (p 41f).  See  also 
her overview in the chapter “Genrekarakteristik.” Likewise Zilliacus accentuates the implicit 
narrative  strategy  in  Myrdal,  and  the  emotional  in  Lidman  (p.  360)  Cf.  Printz‐Påhlson’s 
(1965 and 1971) description of Documentarism as an essentially (non‐expressive) emotio‐
nalist strategy (pp. 212‐214, resp. 233, 235), secretly related to romanticism and romance 
(1971, p. 245), and even fantasy (ibid., p. 248). 
26
  Receptionist aspects are investigated in Malmgren (1977). As for the genre, the perso‐
nal‐emotional, and the literary aspects are stressed in Elveson, pp. 15, 18f, 25‐36, 48, 59f. 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Sartrean dialectics: 27 the habitual on-looker sees himself mirrored in the 
(looked-upon) other’s look as the one-being-looked-at—meaning he is 
seeing how he is seen. Conversely, the one being habitually looked at 
sees himself mirrored as a looker-being-looked-at—seeing how he is 
seen. Finally, the looker sees how he might be capable of returning the 
other’s look.28 The next move, in which the philosophico-political pre-
sentation of the documents intersects with a literary-moral one, recycles 
(explicitly) the pattern of thought in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dori-
an Gray (1891). Thus, the documents portraying the the young western, 
white, civilized, cultivated, and refined nobleman are mirrored in the 
documents portraying an aging, bloodless, decadent, greedy, demorali-
zed, and, frankly, barbarian beast, and with him a whole culture gone 
wild (Incidentally, in the same year, P. O. Enquist put the same figural 
device to the same effect in his historiographic mobile-novel Hess [1966], 
discussed below.) 
Palm introduces the Dorian Gray figure in terms of a metamorphosis, 
which is also an anamorphosis, displaying a double perspective, and, 
perhaps, a puzzle picture: 
He who is merely looking is free to feel beautiful. But after that it won’t work any long‐
er. When we are seen, that noble Greek profile and that proud western face which for 
so many centuries we successfully have shown to the eyes of the world is distorted in a 
moment and an uglier face emerges feature by feature. 
  The thinker’s domed forehead sinks. The scholar’s clear‐sighted vision acquires 
a miserly expression. The young man’s blond, curly hair turns grey and lank. The Chris‐
tian smile stiffens into greedy calculation. The aristocratically straight nose turns fleshy 
or sharp. The thin refined ear  becomes flabby. The democratically even row of teeth is 
replaced by  the  rodent’s pointed  teeth.  The  loving mouth  turns  voracious.  The white 
velvety skin becomes blotchy and rough. The firm chin is replaced by a heavy jowl. So‐
mewhat lower the fatty heart is pounding. 
                                                 
27
  J.‐P.  Sartre  (1943;   1969),  pp.  310‐364;   see  the  presentation  with  notes  and  further 
references in Agrell (1982), chapter 1, in particular p. 32f. For Palm and Sartre, see Eriksson 
(1982), pp. 60‐62. 
28
  G. Palm, En orättvis betraktelse (1966), for instance, the chapter “Pendeln svänger” (p 
32f). 
We no longer recognize ourselves. We have been seen.
29
  
The presentation of a double picture is also a comment on that picture, 
as it prepares for the pattern of thought to come. The presenting mode 
concurrently interprets and reflects on what is presented: the showing is 
a telling, as it were, and the telling is a showing. Here the traditional 
narrative distinction mimesis and diegesis is somehow displaced: not 
exactly dissolved, but interconnected in its own way. Similarly, the jux-
taposition of documented facts is also a superimposition, transforming 
the ongoing text into a hypertext, that is, a palimpsest (as defined by 
Gérard Genette), an overwritten script.30 This is a double-projection, 
akin to well-known modernist montage devices but perhaps also tran-
scending them. On the one hand, documents are visibly juxta- and 
counterposed, an on the other hand, they are just as visibly superimpo-
sed in the sense that they mirror each other. This means that each single 
“picture” is not just referring to, but is actually “showing” another—as 
its immanent reverse Other. And this “chiasmic” mode, as it were, cor-
responds to an emblematic mode of thinking which in Palm’s case also 
comes close to an emblematic art form in a three-fold composition: 
“introducing” inscript, “showing” picture, and “telling” subscript. 
                                                 
29
  Quotation in Swedish :  “Den som bara ser är fri att känna sig vacker. Men sen går det 
inte längre. När vi blir sedda förvrids på ett ögonblick den ädla grekiska profil och det stolta 
västerländska  ansikte  som  vi  under  så  många  århundraden  framgångsrikt  visat  upp  för 
världens blickar och ett fulare ansikte framträder, drag för drag.  Den högvälvda tänkarpan‐
nan sjunker. Den klarseende forskarblicken får ett girigt uttryck. Det ljuslockiga ynglingahå‐
ret grånar och blir stripigt. Det kristna leendet stelnar i lysten beräkning. Den aristokratiskt 
raka näsan blir köttig eller vass. Det tunt förfinade örat tjocknar. Den demokratiskt  jämna 
tandraden ersätts av spetsiga gnagartänder. Den kärleksfulla munnen blir glupsk. Den vita, 
sammetsmjuka hyn blir  rödflammig och sträv. Den  fasta hakan ersätts av en dubbelhaka. 
Ett  stycke nedanför  hakan bultar  fetthjärtat.    Vi  känner  inte  längre  igen oss.  Vi  har  blivit 
sedda.”  Ibid, p. 33. — All  translations  from Swedish  in this paper are mine.  I wish to ack‐
nowledge  the  help  of  Sven  Arne  Bergmann  and  Hans  Löfgren  (Dept.  of  Literature  resp. 
English, Univ. of Göteborg) in improving the linguistic form;  the final result, however, is of 
my own. 
30
  Genette (1982). The term “hypertexte” is defined on pp. 11‐17 and “palimpseste” on p. 
451f. 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The Thought Mode: Emblem Theory 
 
The Renaissance Theory 
Emblem theory derives from a new art form, developed in the late Re-
nissance, interweaving visual facts and verbal ready-mades as well as 
presentational and interpreting modes.31 As an art form, the emblem 
typically manifests a kind of “combine art,” introduced by a verbal insc-
riptio or motto, presenting a visual pictura, in turn commented on by a 
subscriptio. This interweaving corresponds to a particular thought mode, 
“documentary” as it were, recycling the age-old topos of the World-as-
Book and aimed at displaying all visible phenomena as “readables” an-
notating and commenting on one another. The mere presentation of the 
phenomenon was conceived as equivalent to the documentation of this 
phenomenon: not as an autonomous thing, but as a context; as a con-
ceptual network or descriptive system of which the phenomenon in 
question took part, while serving as a complete mirror: reflecting at the 
same time as reflected—the inner workings of a microcosm. 
Since all of the different conceptual networks were interrelated within 
the World-as-Book, seemingly different phenomena could also be graf-
ted upon one another in the same presentational act so as to virtually 
document the topos of the World-as-Book as a sensuous scriptural fact. 
Thus, the emblem displayed Thing and Word and Picture and Scripture 
as corresponding and interacting aspects of the same created and creati-
ve process. This analogical and combinatory mode of thinking promo-
ted “impure” mixtures of otherwise separated elements and meanings. 
                                                 
31
  For the emblem and emblem theory, see P. M. Daly’s Literature in the Light of the Em‐
blem (1979), and his Emblem Theory (1979). The latter presents and discusses the theories 
of  A.  Schöne,  and  D.  Jöns  (nestors  of  modern  emblem  theory).  Also  Höpel  (1987),  who 
focuses on German and didactic‐receptionist aspects, and Russell  (1985), who  focuses on 
French aspects  and also pays attention  to  its presumably modern  traits.  Cf. Agrell  (1993, 
chapters 1.2.3., 1.3.1., 6.2.4., and 10) for further discussion and additional references. 
An interplay of recognition and estrangement, the Renaissance emblem 
arose as a form of “combine art” akin to modernist experiments with 
ready-mades and presentational modes such as collage, montage, brico-
lage, mobile, and various documentary techniques on the one hand and 
on the other a thought-provoking didactics based on disautomatization 
and Verfremdung.32 Seemingly frozen in its gesture of presentation, the 
emblematic mode displays an ongoing process of interrelationships bet-
ween the parts. 
Accordingly, the emblem is to be taken not as a work, an object, or even 
an artefact, but as an interactionist process preparing a certain mode of 
reading, anticipating an addressee, and playing the other’s part, imagi-
ning his or her ways (no matter how alien they may be) while at the 
same time keeping to its strategy.33 But this main course is without clo-
sure: it questions and reflects endlessly on vitally important issues be-
yond all ready-made solutions. As a strategy, the emblematic process 
thus aims at perpetuating itself so as to keep the addressee incessantly 
reflecting on the questions at hand. As a mode of thinking and reflec-
ting, the didactics of the emblem is a process both “educative,” and edi-
fying. It was long the means of initiating the process of Christian Occa-
sional meditation.34 Also, this thought mode, as it pertains to analogical 
and correlative ways of reading and interpreting the world and human 
existence, was inherited from the ancient Christian practice of typologi-
cal exegesis of the Bible. 
Being a fundamental mode of thought, the emblem could in fact also be 
manifested in a purely verbal medium allowing for “word-emblems” 
                                                 
32
  See Weisstein  (1978) ;   cf.  Russell,  pp.  175‐181.  For  “mobile”  (the  term  introduced by 
Michel Butor), see Agrell (1993), chapters 4.2.1., and 7. 
33
  For  the emblematic process,  see especially Russell,  chap.  IV.  For  receptionist aspects, 
and the “alienating,” see for instance Harms (1973). 
34
  See  Höpel,  the  chapter  entitled  “Das  protestantische  geistliche  Emblembuch,”  and 
Lewalsky (1979), chap. 5‐7. As for Sweden, see Hansson, 1991). As for the (Realist) novel, 
see Hunter (1966),  followed up  in his Before Novels  (1990) ;  see also McKeon (1987), and 
Sim (1990). 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(which was the case in English “metaphysical poetry” and in the prose of 
Bunyan, Defoe and Grimmelshausen).35 The word-emblem, however, is 
to be identified in terms of the two main principles of the pictorial em-
blem, one of which is “Priority of picture” and the other is “Facticity (or 
‘potential facticity’) of motif.” Priority of picture means that the em-
blem has a visual aspect which is to be concrete and perspicuous. Facti-
city of motif means that the image content is easy to recognize and has 
conventional significance. In other words: the motif can serve as an 
argument. 
Gabriel Rollenhagen’s FIDUCIA CONCORS 
My first example (Pl. 1) is chosen from the Lutheran emblematist Gab-
riel Rollenhagen’s Selectorum emblematum centuria secunda (1613).36 The 
picture shows a hand on a rod that represents a banner erected in the 
center of a stylized landscape; but the banner is also to be seen as a se-
pulchral monument erected on an anonymous grave. This central figure 
is backgrounded to the right by a turreted building, possibly an inn or a 
country church; and to the left by a flying angel. The entire picture is 
framed by an introductory Latin inscriptionthat says “FIDUCIA 
CONCORS,” or “Unanimous Faith (or Trust),” and serves the function of 
a motto. Below the picture another Latin text is inscribed which in Eng-
lish approximates “He who prays in unanimous faith will receive from 
Christ everything asked for; our Lord will not deny his people 
anything.”37 Referring to what is displayed above, and emphatically re-
peating its motto, this commentary functions of the emblematic subsc-
riptio. And this function. it is a referential gesture which does not finish 
the discourse, but keeps the emblematic process alive as a series of anti-
                                                 
35
  For “word emblem,” see Daly in Literature, chapter 2. 
36
  See Emblemata (1967;  1978), column 1021. The copperplates are made by Cr. de Passe 
(1564‐1637). 
37
  Quotation  in  Latin :   “Quod  petet,  omne  feret,  Christum,  fiducia  concors,/Nil  populo 
Dominus denegat ille, suo.” 
cipations and recallings as well as a display of the emblematic thought 
mode. 
 
How is the process to be read in its ever ongoing entirety? The question 
has to do with the approach to the strategies of the emblematic thought 
mode displayed in the particular emblem. The first thing to notice is the 
emblematic thought mode’s  internally circular character as each mo-
ment refers to another in presenting itself. The second thing to notice is 
its contextual character, as each moment refers to an external text or 
hypogram being processed in the emblem. The third thing to notice is 
the facticity of this referring, meaning that the texts or hypograms in 
question are authorized as “facts” or commonplace truths capable of 
functioning as arguments in a discursive strategy. The emblem docu-
ments the facts while processing them in the emblematic thou
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Accordingly, the fourth thing to notice is the rhetorical character of the 
presenting-referring-documenting-process; it compels the reader to 
follow the lead of each referential gesture. 
In this Rollenhagen case, the motto FIDUCIA CONCORS refers to the 
evangelical cliché of the strong hopeful unity of Christian believers in 
the spiritual war of mortal mundane life; 38 the central banner of the 
picture is the exact emblematic counterpart of this cliché, while the figu-
re of the hand, in general emblematics signifying unanimous faith. As a 
banner, it refers to the struggling aspect of faith as well as to the gaunt-
let, whereas the bar simultaneously refers to the banner-rod, the sword 
and the cross. Being the central Christian symbol, the figure of the 
cross, in turn, “documents” the entire frame of reference pertaining to 
Christ, his strory pf passion and salvation; his vicarious suffering, ato-
nement, and resurrection; and thus also faith, hope, and love. Parts of 
the document are also the opposites: sin, judgement, punishment, suf-
fering and death. The ambiguity of Christian dogma is enhanced as the 
already ambigous banner (victory/death) seems to mark out a tomb, yet 
a tomb somehow guarded by an angel. Thus, the heavenly correlate of 
the double earthly predicament is in the angel as a divine messenger 
signifying resurrection and evangelical hope. The turreted building on 
the emblem is ambiguous too: the inn usually is a sign of sin and mun-
dane transitoriness, while the church refers to the body of Christ and to 
Christian unity, seen as both mundane and transcendental reality.38A 
The doubleness of the picture is aptly elaborated in the subscript which 
recalls, on the hand, how Christ in his Sermon on the Mount preached 
the promise of the beneficient Lord, who caringly anwers the prayers of 
His trustful people; 39 and which, on the other hand, recalls how Christ 
described this trustful people as suffering in this world and as burdened 
                                                 
38
  Cf. for example Phil 1 :27‐28;  and Acts 1 :14, 4 :24, 5 :12. 
38A
  See 1 Cor 12 :12‐31 resp. Emblemata, column 1238. 
39
  Cf. Mt 7 :7‐8, 21 :22 ;  Lk 11 :9‐10;  Mk 11:24;  Jn 14 :13‐14, 15 :7, 15 :16, 16 :23‐24;  and 
1 Jn 3 :22, 5 :14‐16. 
with the task of “carrying his cross on.”40 The ambivalence pertains to 
the explicit Evangelical dogma of folly and offence as intertwined with 
the power of the Cross, and it testifies to this power and indeed effectu-
ates it.41 All verbal and pictorial figures of the emblem are thus grafted 
upon one another or confer their significance upon the other. While the 
emblematic process never ends, each of its frozen moments documents 
the same complex “fact.” 
It should be noted that all these figures are not merely signs or displayed 
significances: they are signifying things, and things are these significan-
ces, thus incarnating them as flesh and blood here and now, as (eternal) 
facts. These signs are what they mean and refer to an absent presence as 
a present absence and vice versa. Theirs is a complex interactive relation-
ship marked by a kind of chiasmic logic that unfortunately defies the 
sensible kind of description I certainly would prefer. But however awk-
ward, this figurative thinking is essential to the emblematic thought 
mode which originates from typological Bible exegesis.42 Rhis interpreta-
tion of the scripture was based on ancient theory of signature and cor-
respondence as well as om the Christian dogma of incarnation where 
Christ as God incarnates, Man, World, and Word (Cf. John 1:1 and 14). 
According to typological method, each Biblical figure not only represents 
but literally is. It is itself as a concrete mundane historical creature, and 
it is its own eternal-transcendental type. Also, each figure as a concrete 
Biblical sign has its counterpart in another concrete Biblical figural 
sign; these disseminated “text-internal” correspondences, in turn, are 
subordinated to the overarching correspondence between the Old and 
the New Testament as signified by the figure of Christ. This entails an 
analogical mode of reading, where, for instance, the sacrifice of Isaac 
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corresponds to the sacrifice of Christ in that the former pre-figures the 
latter, and the latter “fulfills” the former (as Christ is actually killed and 
resurrected). Within the New Testament, the resurrection of Christ is 
further parallelled by the resurrection of Lazarus, and so corresponden-
ces, analogies, parallels, and even significant inversions continue to evol-
ve. 
What is most relevant to us in this problematic sequence is how the 
involved figures also are documents of fact and are metonymically parti-
cipating in the “absent” reality to which they testify, and to which they 
simultaneously belong and refer. This relation is consistent with the 
essential qualities of the emblematic art form: the visuality pertaining to 
the “priority of picture,” and the truth pertaining to the “potential facti-
city“ of the motif it displays. 
Bertold Brecht’s Kriegsfibel 
Bertolt Brecht’s didactic “Lesson no. 45” in Kriegsfibel (1955) offers an 
example of a modern Marxist comparison to Fiducia concors. “Lesson 
no. 45” (Pl. 2) is a documentary photo of a former battlefield covered 
with crosses. One of the crosses has a glove pulled over its top, and the 
glove points upwards. Altogether the image repeats the gesture of the 
Rollenhagen banner. How is this to be understood? The photo is fra-
med by texts: a short English introduction, seemingly the cut-out cap-
tion of the documentary source (in this case an illustrated news magazi-
ne), and a subscript in German, an epigrammatical commentary obvio-
usly added by Brecht. The composition is thus three-fold, employing a 
truly emblematic structure, recycling a traditional emblematic motif, 
and freezing the same gesture. How are these correspondences to be 
read, and how are the differences to be interpreted? 
 
In answering these questions, the first thing to consider is the context of 
the book we are reading. The title presents the ABC’s of the craft of 
war. In this capacity of a primer addressed to the illiterate, the book 
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combines words and pictures as they refer to each other as well as to the 
external “facts” involved. At the same time the book adapts modern 
collage and montage techniques and pertains to the laconic documenta-
rism of Die neue Sachlichkeit, which comprises its dry irony. The mate-
rial consists of documentary cut-outs from contemporary illustrated 
news magazines, and Brecht has rearranged it into new combinations, 
named “photograms.” The term implies, on the one hand, the docu-
mentary and visual character of the material (the “facticity” of motif and 
“priority” of picture, as it were), and it suggests, on the other hand, that 
the pictures are not only to be seen, but virtually read—as is said in the 
Preface to the Kriegsfibel: “Dieses Buch will die Kunst lehren, Bilder zu 
lesen.” 43 This didactic ambition refers to the method of the Biblia Pau-
perum of the late Middle Ages, that is the Bible for the poor and illitera-
te that taught the gospel in figural pictures typologically arranged in 
correlative pairs of central scenes from the Old and the New Testament 
respectively. It is a didactics that shares a frame of reference with the 
homilies, parables, exempla, and morality plays that are recycled in 
Brecht’s previous Hauspostille (1927) and his “Lehrstücke.” 
Thus, this Lesson no. 45 of the Kriegsfibel displays a “photogram,” the 
cut-out of which comprises both the documentary picture of the crosses 
and the introductory English caption which reads: “A line of crosses 
marks American graves near Buna. A grave registrar’s glove accidentally 
points toward the sky.”44 Brecht’s added subscript, the German epigram, 
is inscribed in the cut-out, however—or, rather, virtually written on the 
cut-out using the documentary material as its writing pad as if it were an 
epitaph on a tomb stone. The epitaph gives voice to the dead, the killed 
soldiers, the killed killers, and their voices comment on the “fact” pro-
duced by the picture and the caption. The epitaph reads: “Wir hörten 
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 The wording, however, does not originate 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Brecht but Ruth Berlau, editor of the Kri‐
egsfibel  (who  also  describes  the  photograms  as  “wahre  Hieroglyphentafeln”).  See  also 
Grimm (1969, 1978). 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 The name “Buna” refers to a site  in Croatia and indicates the battlefield of Yugoslavia 
during World War Two. 
auf der Schuhlbank, daß dort oben/ Ein Rächer allen Unrechts wohnt, 
und trafen/ Den Tod, als wir zum Töten uns erhoben./ Die uns hinauf-
geschickt müßt ihr bestrafen”.45 
In this way the photogram takes on a threefold structure corresponding 
to the emblematic composition of presenting inscriptio, displaying pictu-
ra, and commenting subscriptio, while these parts also mirror and com-
ment on each other. The structure also corresponds to the emblematic 
repertory of Rollenhagen’s Fiducia concors, elaborating even his verbal 
imagination. In fact, Brecht elsewhere refers to the emblematically di-
dactic practice of simultaneously veiling and unveiling a “truth” by me-
ans of commonplace “hieroglyphics”; 46 this typically emblematic tho-
ught mode is displayed in the photogram’s simultaneously affirmative 
and and inverse development of Rollenhagen’s verbal imagination. 
Though Brecht seems opposed to Rollenhagen’s displayed promise of 
the Lord’s gifts to his faithful, he himself alludes to the Christian dogma 
of divine justice and punishment, as well as the promise of grace and 
redemption through the vicarious suffering of Christ. As he appears 
merely to displace, question, and recontextualize Christian dogma, 
Brecht might in fact be teaching subversive secrets of Evangelic faith, As 
the ambiguous “we” of the epigram obviously comproses killed and kil-
ling soldiers alike, it evokes the idea of both fighting parts belonging to 
the same community of somehow innocent “sinners”: they are all edu-
cated to wage war, to kill each other on the order of higher evil powers 
who themselves sidestep the physical battle and who force the soldiers to 
commit hideous crimes for which they must vicariously suffer and be 
punishmed. As to “you,” to whom the collective “we” speak from the 
other side of the tomb, you are the illiterate and thus presumably op-
pressed readers and potential soldiers, and you are submitted to the 
same injustice unless you learn how to turn this counterfeit coin upside 
down. 
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Read in this way the photogram displays a secularized version of the 
Christian dogma of atonement projecting a Communist class perspecti-
ve; this reading in turn is intertwined with the Lutheran formula of 
“Justus et Peccator,” which refers to the Christian predicament of being 
invisibly justified, not by deeds, but by faith alone, thus also invisibly 
uniting the believers in a secret, or even subversive, community prepa-
red to defeat the dominion of evil in the day of reckoning. The ABC of 
this lesson of war pertains to the Communist view of Proletarian Inter-
nationalism, in which all oppressed people unite against capitalist do-
minion, bringing the class struggle to a happy ending, and even opening 
an eschatological perspective. By closing the ongoing pre-history of 
mankind, the happy ending opens the true story—or the Communist 
society where the realm of necessity is replaced by the realm of freedom, 
“giving to each according to his needs.” Onviously this Communist 
formula (explicit in the Communist Manifesto), is a secularized counter-
part of the Biblical subscipt of the Fiducia Concors-emblem with its refe-
rence, not in words but in spelling, to the beneficient Lord. The letters 
of this alphabet are displaced in the literal message of the photogram, its 
secret lesson being not how to read but how to un-read, re-read, and re-
combine the “facts” that are seemingly given, so as to finally re-write the 
whole story. In this way the gift of the photogram lesson is not a solu-
tion, but a task. 
This primer thus teaches the illiterate not only how to read verbal ready-
mades, but, also how to distinguish the letters, and how to put the A 
and the B and the C together, in ever-new combinations. In this way, 
the craft of reading that is being taught is to be practiced in writing, in 
an over-writing, as it were, of the discourse that has been read. It is a 
matter of imitating the very method of the teaching discourse. The les-
son is not what it says but what it does as it evokes a reflective practice. 
The Kriegsfibel teaches that to read the “letters” of war it is crucial to 
recombine the “facts,” indeed, to rewrite current norms of political 
grammar and journalist rhetoric. 
The Method: Rhetorical Construction 
 
The Rhetorical Process: Verbal Imagination and Inventions of 
Reading 
Analyzing this kind of visualizing double-coding from a theoretical 
point of view demands a phenomenological approach to the thought 
mode of the studied text; this approach in turn demands a rhetorical 
approach to the inventio-process of the text, or to the verbal imagination 
displayed in its documentary strategies. Altogether the analysis calls for a 
methodical practice roughly corresponding to a rhetorical construction 
which brings forth “the invention of reading” upon which the recycling 
of the documentary material is grounded. Adapting the terminology of 
Clayton Koelb we may describe rhetorical construction as an activity of 
verbal imagination operating on an already given discourse with a view 
to tapping its rhetorical potential.47 The latter discourse is, paradigmati-
cally, a text, a cliché, or some type of commonplace hypogram; but it 
may also be thought of as a genre, a style, an idiom, or even a method, 
as far as these are verbally encoded. Rhetorical construction is thus a 
potential to be found in many forms of processing discourse, provided 
that the reader’s “inventive” point of view is employed in an everyday 
and scholarly, as well as artistic, sense; even discourses that are rhetori-
cal donstructions themselves can be subjected to rhetorical construc-
tions.48 
In Koelb, rhetorical construction should be thought of as a process of a 
verbal imagination “in which complex discourses are generated out of 
close attention to all the possible meanings of other (usually more com-
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pact) linguistic structures.”49 This verbal imagination not only produces 
verbal artefacts (which is trivial), but “uses verbal material as the res (or 
matter) upon which to practice inventio.” This means that a writing 
based on a constructional reading of an apparently simple text opens the 
way for the writing of more complex narrative. It is a reading that keeps 
to the letter in order to discover possibly opposing meanings, the clashes 
of which could be used to produce another text. The opposing mea-
nings discoveed by the reader are thus not to be “deconstructed”; on the 
contrary, they are recorded, held together, and eventually elaborated for 
the purpose of constructing a new narrative discourse, a ‘fiction’ or, 
perhaps, a “faction.”50  
Koelb’s favorite example is Kafka: the very matrix of a narrative like Die 
Verwandlung (1916) is seen in commonplaces like “Du bist ein Ungezie-
fer!” (“You are a roach!”), where the figurative expression is re-read as a 
letter, which in turn is elaborated mimetically; finally both readings are 
realized in a somehow “realist” narrative displaying a detestable man-as-
bug-creature.51 This “logomimetic” type demonstrates but one variant of 
rhetorical construction; there are others, even in Kafka, wherein the 
verbal imagination operates on the “illocutionary” level of discourse; 
that is, it actualizes tacit conventions, commitments, expectations, and 
contextual presuppositions of the entire speech-act or enunciative situa-
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 becoming  that  actual 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 is 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tion in question. Typically, rhetorical constructions, enact a dialogue 
which has “the interaction between text and text as one of its principal 
characteristics.” The texts constructed out of these rhetorical readings 
are in a certain sense “dialogic”: they constitute “a special kind of shared 
territory in that they belong equally to more than one interpretive possibili-
ty. The fictional text mediates between the two conflicting positions, 
giving space and support to each.”52 
Rhetorical construction, then, is not writing but an operation that pre-
cedes and generates writing—an “inventive” reading of an other disco-
urse, not in search of meanings but multiple possibilities of reading 
what is actually being read. The finding of such possibilities engenders a 
process of imagining a new writing and of displaying what has been 
found as a new narrative text. In critical discourse it is a new investigati-
ve text which explores (as it construes) the “inventions of reading” 
found in the other text. In the reading of Kafka, for instance, the ambi-
guous invective (“Du bist ein Ungeziefer!”) is displayed as literally in-
carnated two ways: as a repugnant bug as well as a detestable human 
being. In short, rhetorical construction is a thought mode, operative as 
an inventive mode of reading with a view to finding possibilities of in-
venting a new text, that is, the text to be written on the basis of these 
found (and made) “inventions.” 
The Theoretical Framework: Invention, Repertory, Recycling, and 
Textual Production 
The concepts of Rhetorical construction and Invention of reading keep 
to well-known theories of textual production such as classical rhetoric 
and modern speech act and discourse theory. Thus framed, all texts are 
conceived “as shaped in nontrivial ways by the conditions of their lang-
uage.” This means that “all writing presupposes reading” and that “one 
                                                 
52
  Ibid., p. 21 ;  my italics. 
     17 
can produce discourse only by taking apart the discourse of others and 
reusing the pieces. We must hear before we speak, read before we write.”53  
Accordingly, each “new” text comes into being as a re-reading of already 
given texts and contexts. In this perspective, all textual production is 
seen as a kind of recycling: Wha twhat seems new is a finding and re-
combining of already given elements, a developing of possibilities at 
hand rather than an original creation. This inventing mode of produc-
tion corresponds to the ancient process of inventio as described in classi-
cal rhetoric. Inventio, in the ancient sense of the word, was “making a 
beginning” of a discourse by the process of exploring a given topic (res) 
with a view to finding useful possibilities of thought in it.54 Note that 
the critic’s investigating of that part of “making a beginning” that is 
called inventio is “no hunting for sources, influences or other matters 
pertaining to the establishment of a body of material”; it is rather sear-
ching for the method of invention displayed by the text as it deals with 
the material at hand, the “mode of imagination,” as it were. What is at 
issue here is “a way of doing things” that corresponds to a thought mode 
and an inquiry.55 
The Poetics: Historiographic Metafiction 
 
Defining the Concept 
I am approaching a concept that might help usunderstand the interwea-
ving of documentarism and literary theory. In continuation of the 
“pragmatic” and “poetological” perspective set forth earlier in this essay, 
it is an approach that derives the literary theorizing directly from the 
“documents” or the narrative texts concerned. As to the 1960s, some of 
them are also theoretical while quite a few are theoretical and fictional, 
                                                 
53
   Ibid., p. xii ;  my italics. 
54
  Ibid., p. 2. 
55
  Ibid. 
belonging to a particular reflective and documentary novelistic category, 
which Linda Hutcheon has named historiographic metafiction. 
Introducing this concept in A Poetics of Postmodernism,56 Hutcheon 
emphasizes a certain doubleness of narrative discourse: the texts referred 
to are “both intensely self-reflexive” and yet “also lay claim to historical 
events and personages”—as for instance John Fowles’s The French Lieu-
tenant’s Woman (1969) and Garçia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of 
Solitude (1970). In this way, they “always work within conventions in 
order to subvert them,” albeit without giving them up altogether. Histo-
riographic metafiction incorporates all three domains of literature, histo-
ry and theory; “that is, theoretical self-awareness of history and fiction 
as human constructs (historiographic metafiction) is made the grounds 
for its rethinking and reworking of the forms and contents of the past.” 
Thus, it is not just “historical metafiction”; nor is it “just another ver-
sion of the historical novel or the non-fiction novel;” it is a metafictio-
nally self-reflexive way of speaking powerfully about factual, political 
and historical realities, not of rejecting them. In this way, historio-
graphic metafiction serves as “a kind of model for the contemporary 
writer, being self-conscious about its literary heritage and about the li-
mits of mimesis,” and “yet managing to reconnect its readers to the 
world outside the page.” 
Implications: Reinstalling the ‘Real’ World  
Rejected in modernist formalism and late-modernist metafiction, as well 
as in some current post-modernist philosophizing (Baudrillard), the 
external world is “reinstalled” in historiographic metafiction, although 
on new pragmatic terms which emphasizes its discursive and contextual 
nature. The issue is not whether there is a world or a past, but how we 
can know and communicate about it. This is no relativism, Hutcheon 
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contends, but an interactionist, social stance investigating the discursive 
situation of all human existence57  
This also implies that meaning, reference, and truth are “reinstalled” in 
language; and, likewise, that value is reinstalled in ethics. Yet, no abso-
lutes are demarcated since the reinstalling takes place on interactionist 
and pragmatic terms that are inseparable from context and enunciative 
situation and that conceive of human reality as a social construct. Reins-
talling is thus also a means of investigating and questioning the ongoing 
discourse of world, history, and language without rejecting any of these 
constructs. What is rejected is merely the conception of “the prison hou-
se of language,” and other conceptions presupposing dualism—mind 
and world, the autonomy of the subject, and the estrangement of social 
existence. Even concepts of disbelief such as solipsism and nihilism pre-
suppose a common discourse, according to Hitcheon, although as dog-
matic stances they prevent the questioning of this discourse as well as 
any reconstruction of its constructs.58 Historigraphic metafiction, by 
contrast, presupposes such constructs as necessary fictions, as it presup-
poses narrative as a fundamental mode of human understanding. 
Historiographic metafiction thus keeps to narrative and even realistic 
modes, but it questions these modes as it adopts them, for instance, by 
bringing together historical personages of different epochs or by con-
fronting them with fictional characters. The questions may also arise as 
alternative “histories” originating from combinations of well-known 
names, facts, or clichés that has been recycled as significant concepts of 
multiple references rather than as historical terms with single references. 
Anachronism and pastiche are, of course, much-used devices; but so are 
various kinds of collage, montage, mobile-techniques, and other reduced 
narratives in the mode of documenting a matter, or in the technichal 
mode of handling a material, or in the reflective mode of contextuali-
zing a “fact.” In all these cases, the relation of truth to fiction is, of cour-
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se, at issue, and the significance of both these concepts is under investi-
gation. But however epistemological or ontological the philosophical 
implications, the primary orientation of these strategies is phenomeno-
logical and concerned with existential and political matters simultaneo-
usly. 
Historiographic Metafiction in Swedish Literary Criticism 
of the 1960’s 
 
This orientation towards various modes of historiographic metafiction is 
quite evident in Swedish literary criticism of the 1960s. Two examples, 
both of which are documentary and fabulative, and at odds with com-
monplace Realism, will show how. One exposes an overnarration, the 
other an overdocumentation. The first is an article from 1964, in which 
Sven Delblanc investigates the possibilities of a committed contempora-
ry social novel. The second is a review of Eyvind Johnson’s historical 
novel Livsdagen lång (1964; Life’s Long Day), in which P. O. Enquist 
investigates the possibilities of recycling this genre in service of an enti-
rely different kind of reflection; the review is critical of Johnson’s histo-
rical experimentalism because, in Enquist’s view, it keeps to outmoded 
historical realism. Of special interest, however, is that both articles tend 
to figural, in fact, emblematic, thought modes. 
Displacing the Social Novel:  Sven Delblanc on “Distortion of Reality” 
The starting point in Delblanc’s article, “Romanens fakirer” (The Fakirs 
of the Novel), is the issue of human equality, an acutely-felt problem in 
the young Swedish welfare state. Contending that not even the econo-
mic equality of the welfare state is enough to prevent the persistent de-
gradation of human dignity, Delblanc proclaims the need for a moral 
revival, a conversion, or even a revelation, far beyond the sphere of poli-
tics and economics. To help bring forth this revelation, he claims, is the 
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great mission of the contemporary novel.59 Turning to the strategies of 
this novel, Delblanc rejects “one-dimensional realism,” as he names it, 
whether proletarian or historical; this mode is for sociologists and histo-
rians. Likewise, he rejects enigmatic allegorical strategies of the modern 
technical kind (which he even accuses himself of previously having 
used). What is needed, he contends, is a “samtidsroman,” a “contempo-
rizing” novel, so to speak, that recucles and displaces contemporary mat-
ters and materials and results in a distortion of contemporary reality 
(“verklighetsdistorsion”), but also in condensation and enrichment of 
this reality.60 
The material used to this end must be “documentary” cut-outs of con-
temporary reality: commonplace figures, events and formulas, presented 
by name or in quotes. Recycling and displacing these materials, this 
strategy is at once documentary and fabulative, presentational and nar-
rative, even overnarrative. But it is also stylized, and. in this sense, redu-
ced; and that is one reason why Delblanc names it “mytisk”.61 Another 
reason is that he wants a special kind of representational effect where the 
re-used figures take on a double, virtually figural function. he wants 
them to represent both themselves in their literal carnal-historical exis-
tence, and a broad context of cultural stances and attitudes, correspon-
ding to the “imago” of the official person.62 The figure of the prime mi-
nister Tage Erlander is, as in Delblanc’s Homunculus (1965) for instance, 
to be read both as “himself,” and as a representative of a social and poli-
tical outlook. The latter representation indicates a supra-historical level 
of discourse, which means that the sign is both the thing literally refer-
red to and the context the thing participates in (including the signifi-
cance of its “imago”). 
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This documentary stance pertains not only to modes of historiographic 
metafiction, but to an emblematic thought mode as well. The strategy 
described displays a didactic method comprising priority of picture; 
facticity of motif; and even the emblematic world view of typological 
figures, signatures and correspondences. For the sake of “revelation,” 
moreover, this strategy also displays the maieutic kind of didactics as it 
operates by means of “overnarrative” indirections, displaces “les petits 
faits vrais,” and thus defies exhaustive analysis. Delblanc is quite explicit 
about that aspect.63 
Displacing the Historical Novel:  Enquist on “the Ultimate Freedom of 
the Novel” 
My example of “overdocumentation” demonstrates the same thing in 
the opposite way. In his review “Romanens yttersta frihet” (The Ultima-
te Freedom of the Novel), Enquist rejects historical realism, even in the 
sense of keeping to “facts”; such keeping to facts is what he criticizes in 
Johnson’s experimentalism.64 Anachronisms and “filling the blanks” of 
history—the white spots—are limited functions since they avoid colli-
ding with established historical truths.64A What Enquist envisions is an 
entirely different mode of historical thinking, one that reworks the very 
categories of “fact” and “truth” so as to change the rules of the game. 
Thus, “the ultimate freedom of the novel” is a kind of “lying” which 
displaces the facts in order to produce a different story, wherein well-
known historical figures and events reappear in alien roles and func-
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 Enquist, 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In Enquist’s own wording :  “Han [E.J.] tar sig 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och 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 Ytterst  sällan  bollar  han 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 andra  typer  av 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 (1964,  p.  688;  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 italics).  [”He 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himself the freedom of having his figures speak and talk in unhistorical manners, he 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 himself  the 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of  filling  the  blanks 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 spots  of  history.  [But]  Very 
seldom he 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with other types of facts.] — The words ”filling the blanks”  is a veritable 
formula in Isers receptionist theory ;  see Iser (1976;  1978:  1980), the chapters “The Blank 
as a Potential Connection” and “Functional Structure of the Blanks”. 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tions. This can be done, for instance, by removing the French Revolu-
tion to the Middle Ages or by having Cromwell strangle his father and 
marry his mother. 
The new game involves a rethinking of a given historical repertory and 
decomposes inherited facts and truths into figures and significances that 
can be recycled and recombined into alternative histories. This means 
that “facts” take on the function of signs; these signs in turn are trans-
posed to a new kind of things, namely, their own significances, which 
signify not only what they are (a given ‘“fact”) but also what they might 
have been or done (a potential facticity), had the circumstances been 
different. In this way, playing the ongoing game will refer to past or 
future games played under different yet conceivable circumstances. 
Changing the circumstances of the game so as to lay bare its presupposi-
tions and “rules” is the unique task of the historical novel, Enquist con-
tends, since it is the ultimate freedom of the novel, and only by making 
use of its freedom as a novel the historical novel is justified.65 
The result of this, according to Enquist, is an “antihistorical” and “anti-
realist” novel which provides us with a new kind of realism, as well as 
with a new history, and which displays the real and the past as a reperto-
ry of mobile thought figures. These figures supply writer and reader 
alike with reflective modes of constructing reality without really inven-
ting it, of recycling and recombining given facts, and of questioning the 
construction in the very act of constituting it. However subversive, it is 
not a relativistic stance since the is pragmatic: the “ultimate freedom of 
the novel” is not the freedom of life since no human life can be lived 
without commitments. That is precisely why the novel is needed as 
well—for the two to supplement each other. 
In this way, Enquist’s idea of a new historical novel answers to Del-
blanc’s idea of a new social novel. Both strategies provide a way of mobi-
lizing the given without suspending its facticity, and a way of “contem-
porizing” history without suspending its pastness. Both keep to “facts” 
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as a repertory of signs and significances capable of producing new con-
texts, while still preserving their facticity. Both strategies thus are also 
figural. Enquist’s strategy, however, seems to imply an overdocumenta-
tion, decomposition, and dissemination of significances, whereas Del-
blanc’s strategy implies overnarrating, interweaving, and gathering. 
Likewise, as regards documentarism, Enquist’s strategy pertains to histo-
riographic metafiction: it questions historical thought modes and narra-
tive conventions in the very act of submitting to them; and inversely, it 
preserves them in the very act of questioning them. It is a strategy that 
pertains to emblematic thought modes as well as emphasizes priority of 
picture, facticity of motif, and figuration within a system of analogies 
and correspondences. And finally, it is also the strategy of the fragmen-
ted discourse of Enquist’s next novel after the review, Hess (1966). A 
fragment of this text will be discussed with reference to my initial com-
ments on Göran Palm and will form the conclusion of my presentation 
of “Documentarism and Theory of Literature”. 
Historiographic Metafiction and Emblematics 
 
Introducing Enquist’s Hess 
Introducing this fragment necessitates a few words about Hess.66 On the 
title page of the book the text is explicitly presented as “Roman,” that is, 
a novel; but how it is a novel is hard to describe since the principle of 
their order seems as obscure as the fictional frame of the whole arran-
gement. The title, however, refers to a historical person: “Rudolf Hess” 
was the proper name of Hitler’s private secretary, his stand-in, and even 
the ghostwriter of his autobiography, Mein Kampf (I-II, 1925-1926). In 
1966 Hess was still alive: by acting—or being—insane, he escaped a 
death sentence at Nuremberg and spent the rest of his days in the Span-
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dau prison, where he died in 1987, his case still a puzzle to historians.67 
The title Hess implies a historical novel, and its first narrative fragment 
confirms what one might expect from this genre, although the fragment 
deals not with Hess but with his aide Pintsch, in his turn Hess’ stand-in. 
The second fragment displays a formal discourse on historical method 
and seems to introduce a thesis of historical scholarship. A scholarly 
reading of this fragment is somewhat confirmed by the third fragment, 
which is to be our example and which comments on an excerpt of 
Hess’s autobiographic fragments. At this point in the narrative, though, 
the presumed thesis seems poorly organized and reminiscent of a work 
in progress. 
A fourth fragment digresses with biography of Daniel Defoeand gives an 
account of his meeting Hess, displacing the hypothesis that flagrant 
anachronism is incompatible with a scholarly manuscript in progress—
although this kind of “lying” certainly pertains to acknowledged “truths” 
about the ambiguous devices used by the novelist Defoe, who was foste-
red in Puritan documentarism, including autobiographism, figuralism, 
and emblematic thought modes.68 The novelist Defoe is quoted extensi-
vely in the novel Hess, without quotation marks, assimilated in the di-
scourse. This invisible stealing is a frequent device in Hess, which grabs 
all kinds of material, be it literary, profane, or sacred. Its diversity of 
documents even include religious autobiography, and wether it refers to 
Hess, his investigator, or somebody else within this veritable oratory of 
voices we cannot know, since the continuing displacement of discourse 
also makes the authorial position go adrift. One never knows for sure 
who is speaking. 
The successive fragments of this alleged manuscript named Hess turn 
out to be an intersection for all kinds of discourse in a never-ending 
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(1980), p. 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“Journal 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the relation to Hess of 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matters, see 
Agrell (1993), chapters 6.2.4 and 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process. In fact, the process does not seem aimed at anything in particu-
lar exept for the very processing of anything—everything. Likewise, the 
proper name “Hess,” within this discourse, is attatched to virtually any-
body (or Everyman). The figure of Hess positions all incompatibles in a 
roundabout of differences, and no synthesis is found or even sought. 
This is not to say that it is a random discourse, void of “bias.” On the 
contrary, it gradually becomes clear that its processing of all kinds of 
“facts,” its very mobile character, is exactly what makes the “manuscript” 
a truly con-temporary novel, even as regards “bias.” The novel is all-
encompassing, polyphonic, as it were, and displays all existence as a web 
of correlative quotations (though not in a Joycean mode); indeed the 
very formula “Existence [or man] as a quotation” is also an oft-quoted 
phrase within this novel. This means that the figure of Hess, who pre-
serves the loaded significance of the historical name, keeps the discourse 
within a context of crime and guilt, comprising all mankind. In this 
way, the figure of Hess questions our humanity and our concept of hu-
manness in the particular sense of civilized man: modern man, western 
man, and imperialist man. Within the mobile these concepts are moul-
ded on Hess, whose figure simultaneously mirrors how we see and how 
we are seen. It traps Dorian Gray in the lines of his portrait. 
Fragment no. 3:  Displaying the “Emblem” 
This is where my discussion of fragment no. 3, which is the first of its 
(manifold) versions in the novel, comes in. This fragment deals explicit-
ly with an emblem: hanging above the main entrance of Hess’s school. 
The first version refers to Hess’s autobiography and paraphrases an 
ekphrasis of the emblem picture: 
3. In one of his autobiographical outlines Hess has described the emblem of his school, 
the one hanging above the main entrance. It was painted by Jean Bulesco, a French ar‐
tist of the nineteenth century and a close friend of James Abbot McNeill Whistler’s, and 
also  the  latter’s host during his French period ;   I need not dwell any  further on these 
matters. The colours are white, gold, and green. In the centre of the emblem stands a 
man. He is on his way out of a forest. He has a cudgel in his hand, his hair is tangled, but 
his face quiet and authoritative. His visage might be described as illumined by cold con‐
fidence. But there is also a trait of mannered refinement, of loftiness, perhaps of educa‐
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tion, which sharply contrasts the impression the figure makes on the observer in other 
respects. Around his hips the man wears a broadcloth, an animal hide, and in one hand 
he holds an animal only just killed, problably a roe deer. When at school the concept of 
romanticism was about to be introduced, certain teachers used to use the emblem, the 
man in the emblem, as an example of what was meant by the concept of »the noble sa‐
vage». The savage of the emblem, however, has a peculiarity :  he is a blond.
69
  
This description shows an ambiguous figure who absorbs contradictory 
traits. The savage and the civilized man are interwoven in terms of 
“noble savageness” and “savage nobility,” and within this figuration, one 
is mimicking the other. The effect is that of a quadruple vision, a puzzle 
picture portraying some kind of monster, which in fact is quite unima-
ginable. Yet it is said to refer to a factual painting, attributed to a friend 
of Whistler’s, the controversial painter of the late nineteenth century, in 
between impressionism, symbolism, and modernism, whose physical 
existence is a historical “fact.” The historical facticity of his alleged fri-
end, “Bulesco” is to be questioned, however; perhaps he is a “faction” 
just as much as the “impossible” picture attibuted to him. (I have really 
tried to trace him!) 
This picture, however “impossible,” is said to have been used in teaching 
in Hess’s school as a typical example of factual commonplace, namely 
“what was meant with the romantic concept of »the noble savage»”, that 
is, referring to a factual commonplace. The example, though, seems to 
obscure the “facts” rather than document them or to question the facts 
                                                 
69
  Quotation 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förfi‐
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figuren 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höfterna 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mannen 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kläde, 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djurhud, och i 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hand 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djur, 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 ta 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 emblemet, 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exempel på vad som avsågs med begreppet »den ädle vilden». Emblemets vilde har dock 
en egenhet :  han är blond.” Hess, p. 11. 
by provoking an uneasy reflection. And the puzzle picture does indeed 
display a thought figure as it makes the commonplace of “the noble 
savage” correspond to the idea of Dorian Gray’s portrait. It corresponds 
to the portrait not as a separate artefact, or even an inverse copy, but to 
the portrait as seen by Dorian himself as he tries to recognize the origi-
nal (the “blond” man) and at the same time dissociates himself from the 
picture, o separate separate the traits of the man from those of the bru-
te.70 This is impossible of course. Within the given frame one trait pro-
trudes in the disguise of the other with the implication that either the 
man is a brute or the brute is a man, depending on how the onlooker 
changes his or her focus. The “pure” figure can never be seen, but wha-
tever is seen is thought-provoking, no matter how horrifying. It is im-
plicitly warning, instructing, and edifying and yet maieutic, processive, 
questioning, displacing the ready-mades displayed. This is an emblema-
tic gesture, corresponding to the emblematic thought mode described 
and displayed in the fragment. It therefore also fulfills the “emblem” 
referred to in the first phrase of this fragment. 
From the point of view of the novel Hess, the whole fragment is an em-
blem—a word-emblem, and the (paraphrased) ekphrasis roughly corres-
ponds roughly to the emblematic pictura, the commonplace of “the 
noble savage” to the inscriptio, and the reflective comment to the subsc-
riptio. In the mode of the word-emblem, these three parts are not always 
separable on paper; in fact ther interplay may reinforce the emblematic 
function. What makes the emblem is not the three-part division in it-
self, but the priority of picture and the facticity of motif, permeated 
with the “quadruple” type of thought mode just described. The emblem 
is where visualizing, recycling, and displacing of commonplaces are bro-
ught about by thought-provoking analogies and correspondences as 
aspects of a self-trial in progress. 
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Analysis: Rhetorical Construction 
 
The Emblematic Principles 
Let me propose a detailed analysis of how this is done in the Hess frag-
ment. Since the fragment paraphrases an ekphrasis, striving to recreate a 
visual impression of an “emblem,” the principle of priority of picture 
clearly dominates the structure of the fragment. This principle also per-
tains to the documentary ambition of the historical scholar who presu-
mably seeks the “truth” of the “event” Hess by exploring the relevant 
“facts” presented in documents. This historical ambition, in turn, pre-
supposes the principle of facticity of motif. Since, however, the visual 
impression in question is strongly ambiguous, and even mobile, the 
paraphrase is also embedded in a corresponding thought mode. In fact, 
it must be imagined (by us) as virtually quadrupling a “previous” ambi-
guity already found in the “original” which is not the historical “em-
blem” referred to, but the description of this emblem (in Hess’s manusc-
ript.) This quadrupling is inevitable, granted that the paraphrase is a 
reading of this manuscript and and an attempt to transfer its ekphrasis 
without quoting it. The paraphrase is clearly an interpretation that is 
intertwined with the comment on the (ambigous) looks of “the man in 
the emblem” that I have already mentioned. 
As for facticity of motif, the “the noble savage” fulfills this criterion, 
since this motif corresponds to a commonplace concept and is acknow-
ledged both within the fictional context and the external context of the 
novel and its readers in the 1960s. Then again, this acknowledged com-
monplace is displaced in a paraphrase. First, the “savage” is a blond (im-
plying civilized Western man), and second, the whole figure is seen as a 
mobile ambiguity which discloses the concept as a four-fold contradic-
tion and deprives the commonplace of its positive impact. The displa-
cement which pertains to the emblematic thought mode also opens a 
new level of facticity, which corresponds to the horizon of expectation 
in the late 1960s when political commitment contested Western fascism, 
imperialism, and neo-colonialism. On this level the facticity of the 
commonplace motif of “the noble savage” refers to the “facticity” of 
modern imperialism: it ctivates the same frame of reference and the 
same verbal imagination (including the Dorian Gray figure) as the one 
displayed in Palm’s En orättvis betraktelse, also from 1966. 
Hercules / the Wild Man 
In the Hess fragment, however, the displacement produces a reversal of 
perspective. It operates on the verbal imagination as the formula “the 
noble savage” is invisibly transformed to “the savage noble”. The two 
formulations are not identical, but the two structures are simultaneous 
and the oneis  superimposed on the other in an ongoing process. Follo-
wing this lead, we are brought back to the previous  “romantic” concept 
of “the noble savage”: this figure, too, is a combined concept, composed 
of two earlier commonplaces, both emblematically significant. One is 
the emblematic Hercules and the other is the heraldic Wild Man.71 
The emblematic Hercules is the “civilized,” reflective version of the mo-
rally ambiguous hero of classical antiquity, the strong fighter, also na-
med “the furious Hercules”. The emblematic Hercules is usually portra-
yed “at the crossroads,” facing the necessity of choosing his way of life: 
either the laborious way of virtue or “civilization” in terms of morals, 
law, and order, and the “schooling” of social life, or the unrestrained 
way of vice or “barbarity,” running wild in the moral morass of the fo-
rest (Pl. 3). The emblematic Hercules, however, does not choose but he 
is caught at the moment of choosing as he considers the alternatives in 
agony.72 The emblematic Hercules is in a universal and fundamentally 
existential situation; and the emblematic documentation of this timeless 
fact (by means of the commonplace) serves the didactic-maieutic func-
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tion of activating the situation as a fact here and now and as one reflec-
ted on in the emblematic process. 
This emblematic Hercules is identified by his typical attributes: his club 
or cudgel, his animal hide (most often a lion), and his tousled and unti-
dy looks—all derived from the ancient hero, and the attributes of “the 
man in the emblem” in the Hess-fragment. What makes the figure emb-
lematic is the motif of the crossroads, a scene explicitly displayed or 
otherwise alluded to by the context. In the Hess fragment the scene is 
explicitly displayed indeed. It catches “the man” in the moment of hesi-
tation, “standing … on his way out of a forest;” and it shows an aspect 
that is further developed in the variant versions of the motif in later 
fragments of the novel.73 But already in the first version the emblematic 
moment is problematized and its timeless originality historicized by 
traits of education, culture, and even mannerism, which are described in 
the hero’s face. The description implies not only a previous schooling, 
but decadence and regression; and this regression is itself a forecast pro-
jecting present possibilities as a future fact. 
The heraldic Wild Man, in turn, is identified by the same attributes as 
the emblematic Hercules. In fact, the figure of the former is often mixed 
up with that of the latter (for example, the animal hide around Hercu-
les’ hips is sometimes replaced with the leafy branches traditionally at-
tributed to the Wild Man; Pl. 4). No wonder, since one figure is just as 
ambiguous as the other and since this ambiguity being his very signifi-
cance as “wild.” It fits this description that the heraldic Wild Man was 
traditionally and literally marginalized. He was a marginal figure be-
longing to the frame of the heraldic emblem and fulfilling the function 
of shield bearer by holding up the coat of arms. In this way he is seen to 
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support and present, demonstrate, and even guard the shield—although 
as a servant, kept outdoors, his wildness is seen to be domesticated.74 
In the figure of the Wild Man a number of contrasts intersect, or “run 
wild,” as it were: on the one hand, the traits of the traditional warrior, 
such as physical strength, aggressiveness, even fury and cruelty; on the 
other hand, the traits of an outlaw, the outsider, the naive, or even tradi-
tional fool. The latter traits pertain to the “primitive” sphere of the con-
cept of “wildness,” a sphere that also includes innocence, and even holi-
ness (remember the Christlike “idiot,” prince Myshkin of Dostojevskij’s 
novel The Idiot [1868-1869]). The aforementioned “warrior” sphere is no 
different in that it is pre-moral, and beyond good an evil in a state of 
“naturalness” where the concepts of crime, sin, and guilt are not yet 
invented, but all is life (cf. the Nietzschean concept). The structure of 
this state beyond good and evil corresponds to the prelapsarian state of 
Paradise as it is desplayed in the Biblical commonplace (which compri-
ses the possibility of evil). The positive impact of this Biblical context is 
isolated in the commonplace of “the noble savage” whereas its negative 
impact—sin and the possibility of sin, or the Fall of Man—is isolated in 
the commonplace of the devil and the devilish villain. Evil is primarily 
not conceived of as aggressiveness, fury, or other traits of uncontrolled 
passion, but as self-conscious, educated cunning and sly calculating re-
flectionunder the guise of the good. 
Displacing “the Noble Savage” 
As this deceitfulness pertains to the commonplace of “the noble savage” 
as displayed in Hess, its significance also pertains to the concepts of both 
Nazism (the historical context associated with the proper name “Hess”), 
and Imperialism (the contemporary context associated with the year the 
novel was published). In fact the two “isms” are intertwined within the 
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pictura ;   that  is,  the coat of arms. See Bernhei‐
mer,  for  example,  particularly  the  chapter.  “His  Heraldic  Role,”  and  the  pictures  in  Neu‐
becker (1976;  1982), pp. 196‐199. 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documentary fiction of the novel. In Nazism, the displaced (or even 
“deconstructed”) version of “the noble savage” discloses the primitivist 
traits of the Nazi ideology: the cult of “the noble Aryan” necessitates 
that the is blond, but also that he (as a potential Nazi hero) is well-
mannered and cunning, capable of political double-talk and of deceiving 
the masses to believe in dictatorship, racism, concentration-camps, and 
war of conquest in the service of morality, honour, law, and order. 
In Imperialism the displacing of “the noble savage” in terms of “the 
savage noble” discloses fundamental contradictions in modern Western 
man. As an intellectual he has a nostalgic passion for the “primitive” and 
“naive,” archaic, and exotic, because these qualities compensate for his 
own overcultivated spleen and decadence. But he is also inclined to 
transmit his own decadent culture to his “primitive” fellow-men in the 
disguise of education and by rejecting in practice what he is so senti-
mental about. As a pillar of society (a business man or politician), he 
oppresses and exploits other people in the guise of benefactor and civili-
zation hero, who “nobilizes” the savages. In doing so, he is neither sava-
ge or wild in the pre-moral sense, but (according to his own “moral” 
lexicon) simply evil. It is this doubleness of the figure which parallels  
the relation between Dorian Gray to his portrait when he sees himself as 
he is seen. 
Displacing Himself:  the Autobiographical Sphere 
The self-referring aspect of the Wild Man of course pertains to the fact 
of the ekphrasis of the emblem recurring in the autobiography of Hess, 
who seems to be the figure in focus. In fact, the figure of the Wild Man 
seems to play the same role in the historiographic “manuscript,” which 
deals with Hess and his manuscripts, although the latter texts are now 
filtered through the consciousness of the presumed scholar. This scholar 
seems to mirror himself in Hess and sees himself as the other and the 
other as himself. While confusing his scholarly stance, this double vision 
is part of the “biased” impact of the mobile novel, and part of its fictio-
nal discourse. It is a discourse (I reluctantly admit) that originates in the 
author of the novel, the historical and factual person of P. O. Enquist. 
At the time h was writing Hess he was also writing his own licentiate 
thesis; 75  in an essay he has even declared that he mirrored his scholarly 
process in his novel.76 Moreover, Enquist was brought up in the 
northern Swedish province of Västerbotten, and educated in the religio-
us tradition of “Evangeliska fosterlandsstiftelsen,” a revivalist movement 
within the Swedish church. This may have prepared the ground for his 
special interest in emblematics and typological strategies since these 
things belong to his religious background. But it may also have prepared 
him for his special interest in the figure of the Wild Man. 
This figure happens to be a part of the heraldic emblem of the county of 
Västerbotten (Pl. 5) and the Northern regiment stationed in Umeå, the 
provincial capital. The regimental magazine is even called Vildmannen 
(Pl. 6).77 In the 1960s, the magazine still frequently referred to its title 
figure, although mainly in the “tamed,” subordinated aspects of an 
amenable tool (reminiscent of the context of the Brechtian Kriegsfibel). 
This Wild Man is a common soldier commanded to behave as a warri-
or, maybe against his will—or maybe not. 
The autobiographical track of Hess leads further, not only back to the 
author, but also back to some kind of reality we might have in common, 
despite our personal peculiarities. But I’ll stop here, and make my sum-
mary. 
Exit 
 
All the themes discussed above, be they historical, political, ideological, 
moral, or autobiographical, are further elaborated as the mobile novel 
moves on and mounts them on each other. The entire collage of frag-
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 Enquist’s licentiate thesis was on the Swedish author Thorsten Jonsson. 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 See Enquist’s “Sidokommentar” (1966), p. 62. 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 Vildmannen. Medlemsblad  för Kungl. Västerbottens Regementes Kamratförening,  first 
issue in 1934. For the coat 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arms, see Konow (1980). 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ments discloses a montage of narrative fragments and presenting devices 
typified by Thomas Mann and Alexander Kluge, respectively. It is a 
documentary montage in the double sense that it recucles various kinds 
of “documents,” and investigates and arranges them they can question 
“facts” or historical issues. This strategy, in turn, is also to be described 
in terms of historiographic metafiction. It is historiographic because its 
implied fictional frame is an historiographic manuscript or a scholarly 
thesis in progress and because it intermingles narrative and documentary 
devices and recucles documents that are also “authentic.” It is metafic-
tional because it questions the “facts” of the documents as well as its 
own methods of inquiry. It should be noted, however, that its metafic-
tional strategy is not narcississtic in the sense of self-centered; on the 
contrary, it is other-oriented as it displaces such modern and modernist 
conceptions as the self-sufficient ego and the sovereign subject. This is 
not done to dissolve or destroy the personal dimension of man; it is 
done to recontextualize this dimension in interactionist terms and in a 
context where man as related to his fellow-men and given his person 
only in interaction with the other. 
This is the foremost existential impact of the novel and of the way its 
historiographic-metafictional strategy displays its own coming into 
being. It writes a reading (of the Hess documents); it is read and reread 
as the “mobile” discourse moves on; the subject/object-relation of its 
writing/reading is incessantly reversed; and finally it attempts to have its 
discourse transcended as readers read it as a novel. Altogether it is in an 
emblematic thought mode, seen in the perspective of the priority of 
picture and the facticity of motif as I have tried to demonstrate it by 
applying a method of rhetorical construction to the verbal imagination 
of the fragment of scrutinity.78 
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 It  should be noted  that  the modern  secularized  themes and devices discussed  in  this 
essay also commingle with concepts of guilt and grace in the Protestant Christian tradition 
(revolving around the theological context of agape). How all this is done must be left out in 
this paper since the purpose here is mainly introductory. See Agrell (1993), chapters 6.1.2., 
and 11. 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